منابع مشابه
Corruption and Resource Allocation: Evidence from China
Exploiting a unique data set containing transactions data from a panel of 769 Chinese stateowned enterprises between 1980 and 1989, this paper tests microeconomic implications of a pervasive form of corruption—official diversion of under-priced, in-plan goods to the market. Corruption has the predicted effects on resource allocation. Official under-pricing of in-plan goods, which lowers the mar...
متن کاملCorruption and Social Interaction: Evidence from China
We explore theoretically and empirically whether social interaction, including local and global interaction, influences the incidence of corruption. We first present an interaction-based model on corruption that predicts that the level of corruption is positively associated with social interaction. Then we empirically verify the theoretical prediction using within-country evidence at the provin...
متن کاملThe Causes of Corruption: Evidence from China
In this study we explore in detail the causes of corruption in China using two different sets of data at the regional level (provinces and cities). We observe that regions with more anti-corruption efforts, histories of British rule, higher openness, more access to media and relatively higher wages of government employees are markedly less corrupt; while social heterogeneity, regulation, abunda...
متن کاملCorruption and Resource Allocation under China’s Dual-Track System
Detailed transaction and price data from 769 Chinese state-owned enterprises reveal that corruption — official diversion of under-priced in-plan industrial goods to the market — was pervasive in China between 1980 and 1989. More important, corruption has a significant impact on the allocation of both in-plan and outside-plan resources in ways that are consistent with implications of an extended...
متن کاملResource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence
Across many forms of rent seeking contests, the impact of risk aversion on equilibrium play is indeterminate. We design an experiment to compare individuals’ decisions across three contests which are isomorphic under risk-neutrality, but are typically not isomorphic under other risk preferences. The pattern of individual play across our contests is not consistent with a Bayes-Nash equilibrium f...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2001
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.282523