Corruption and product market competition: An empirical investigation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Corruption and Product Market Competition∗
It is generally considered that more competition might help curb corruption, as rents, which motivate corrupt agreements, are decreasing in the degree of competition. This paper proposes a framework to analyze the relationship between corruption and competition. It studies the optimal incentive scheme for potentially corrupt officials in charge of inspecting firms that compete in the product ma...
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Policy makers in Europe have been concerned that lack of product market competition have led productivity to lag behind the US. Theoretical models are ambiguous about the direction of the effect that product market competition should have on productivity. On the one hand increasing competition lowers firm’s profits and thus reduces incentives to exert effort (the Schumpeterian effect), on the o...
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This paper investigates the effect of corruption on competition in government procurement auctions. Our assumption is that the bureaucrat (i.e. the agent that administers the market), if corrupt, may provide a favor in exchange for a bribe. The favor we consider in most of our analysis is the opportunity to readjust a bid. We show that a key effect of corruption is to facilitate collusion in pr...
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How does competition in a firm's product market affect the behavior of its stock? We examine this question in a noisy rational expectations economy in which firms operate under monopolistic competition. Production is subject to productivity shocks and requires capital, raised on a perfectly competitive equity market. Investors observe firms' past profits and collect private information about th...
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A firm facing employment protection will defend its market position more fiercely than a firm operating without such restrictions. However, ex ante it will be more reluctant to expand its market position. For the benchmark case of contest competition, the defensive effect dominates. A firm facing employment protection has a stronger average market position. JEL classification: D44, J63
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Development Economics
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0304-3878
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.02.010