Correlation in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Coordination and Signal Design: The Electronic Mail Game in Asymmetric and Multiplayer Settings
We examine the nature of the coordination failure in Rubinstein’s Electronic Mail Game, a classic game-theoretic paradox in which parties are unable to coordinate on a mutually beneficial action, and we propose a principle for designing more successful signaling protocols. When signaling technology is such that signals fail to reach their destination with small probability, it is important that...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1935-1704
DOI: 10.1515/1935-1704.1576