Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information
An isotone pure strategy equilibrium exists in any game of incomplete information in which (1) each player i’s action set is a finite sublattice of multi-dimensional Euclidean space, (2) types are multidimensional and atomless, and each player’s interim expected payoff function satisfies two “non-primitive conditions” whenever others adopt isotone pure strategies: (3) single-crossing in own act...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1941708