Correlated equilibria in some classes of two-person games

Computing Equilibria for Two-person Games

Computing Equilibria for Two-Person Games

This paper is a self-contained survey of algorithms for computing Nash equilibria of two-person games given in normal form or extensive form. The classical Lemke{Howson algorithm for nding one equilibrium of a bimatrix game is presented graph-theoretically as well as algebraically in terms of complementary pivoting. Common deenitions of degenerate games are shown as equivalent. Enumeration of a...

Stochastic dominance equilibria in two-person noncooperative games

Two-person noncooperative games with finitely many pure strategies and ordinal preferences over pure outcomes are considered, in which probability distributions resulting from mixed strategies are evaluated according to t-degree stochastic dominance. A t-best reply is a strategy that induces a t-degree stochastically undominated distribution, and a t-equilibrium is a pair of t-best replies. The...

cient Computation of Equilibria for Extensive Two Person Games

The Nash equilibria of a two person non zero sum game are the solutions of a certain linear complementarity problem LCP In order to use this for solving a game in extensive form it is rst necessary to convert the game to a strategic description such as the normal form The classical normal form however is often exponentially large in the size of the game tree In this paper we suggest an alternat...

Efficient Computation of Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games

The Nash equilibria of a two-person, non-zero-sum game are the solutions of a certain linear complementarity problem (LCP). In order to use this for solving a game in extensive form, the game must first be converted to a strategic description such as the normal form. The classical normal form, however, is often exponentially large in the size of the game tree. If the game has perfect recall, a ...