Correlated Equilibria in Homogenous Good Bertrand Competition
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Correlated equilibria in homogenous good Bertrand competition∗
We show that there is a unique correlated equilibrium, identical to the unique Nash equilibrium, in the classic Bertrand oligopoly model with homogenous goods and identical marginal costs. This provides a theoretical underpinning for the socalled “Bertrand paradox” as well as its most general formulation to date. Our proof generalizes to asymmetric marginal costs and arbitrarily many players in...
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Unique Nash Equilibrium: p1 = p2 = c. Proof: If pi = c, then there is no price at which firm j can earn strictly positive profit so that pj = c is a best response. Thus, p1 = p2 = c is a NE. To show uniqueness, note that if c < pi < pj , then firm j earns zero profit and can do strictly better by unilaterally deviating and charging a price ∈ (c, pi). If c = pi < pj , then firm i earns zero prof...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2483070