Correction to: Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On the Complexity of Borda Control in Single-Peaked Elections
Recent research reveals that many NP-hard voting problems in general become polynomial-time solvable in single-peaked elections. In contrast to these results, we prove for the first time that constructive control by adding/deleting votes for Borda are NP-hard even in single-peaked elections. On the other side, we prove that constructive control by adding/deleting votes/candidates for Borda are ...
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Both weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems have been proved NP-hard. However, there is no exact combinatorial algorithm known for these problems. In this paper, we initiate the study of exact combinatorial algorithms for both weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems. More precisely, we propose O∗((m · 2)) time andO∗(t2m) time combinatorial algorithms for weighted and un...
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We consider the problem of control in elections where an election chair seeks to either make a designated candidate win, or prevent her from winning, via actions such as adding, deleting, or partitioning either candidates or voters. These scenarios have been studied for many voting systems and the related control problems have been classified in terms of their complexity. However, for one of th...
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Reports an error in "Should I stop or should I go? The role of associations and expectancies" by Maisy Best, Natalia S. Lawrence, Gordon D. Logan, Ian P. L. McLaren and Frederick Verbruggen (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 2016[Jan], Vol 42[1], 115-137). In the article, there is an error in Table 3 of the Results and third paragraph of the Results section l...
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In this paper, we set up a framework to study approximation of manipulation, control, and bribery in elections. We show existence of approximation algorithms (even fully polynomial-time approximation schemes) as well as obtain inapproximability results. In particular, we show that a large subclass of scoring protocols admits fully polynomial-time approximation schemes for the coalitional weight...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0176-1714', '1432-217X']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01378-z