Correction to: Voluntary disclosure when private information and disclosure costs are jointly determined
نویسندگان
چکیده
A Correction to this paper has been published: 10.1007/s11142-021-09623-7
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Accounting Studies
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1380-6653', '1573-7136']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-021-09623-7