Correction to: Reduced-form mechanism design and ex post fairness constraints

Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design

We study what kind of equilibria of which mechanisms are ex post renegotiation-proof (EPRP), i.e., robust against the possibility of ex post renegotiation under a variety of renegotiation procedures, and which social choice functions are EPRP implementable. In complete information environments with two agents only budget balanced Groves allocations are EPRP implementable, while with three or mo...

Ex - Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design ∗

We characterize ex post incentive compatible public decision rules, and apply this characterization to (i) bilateral trade and (ii) public good provision.

Correction: Expanded HTA: Enhancing Fairness and Legitimacy

Fairness Constraints: A Mechanism for Fair Classification

Abstract Automated data-driven decision systems are ubiquitous across a wide variety of online services, from online social networking and ecommerce to e-government. These systems rely on complex learning methods and vast amounts of data to optimize the service functionality, satisfaction of the end user and profitability. However, there is a growing concern that these automated decisions can l...

Sequential communication with ex post participation constraints

This paper examines an informed principal-agent game with ex post participation constraints for the agent. It shows that the players do not loss by communicating in turn among themselves rather than simultaneously if and only if the principal communicates first. It then considers any Bayesian allocation rule implemented in this bilateral asymmetric information framework. It provides necessary a...