Correction to: complexity minded antitrust

On complexity of single-minded auction

We consider complexity issues for a special type of combinatorial auctions, the single-minded auction, where every agent is interested in only one subset of the commodities. First, we present a matching bound on the communication complexity for the single-minded auction under a general communication model. Next, we prove that it is NP-hard to decide whether Walrasian equilibrium exists in a sin...

Correction to 'Minimum Complexity Density Estimation'

Manuscript submitted July 1991. A. R. Barron is with the Department of Statistics and the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Illinois, 101 Illini Hall, 725 S. Wright Street, Champaign, IL. 91820. T. M. Cover is with the Departments of Electrical Engineering and Statistics, Durand, Room 121, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. IEEE Log Number 9103053. ‘A. R. Ba...

Private Antitrust Enforcement Revisited: The Role of Private Incentives to Report Evidence to the Antitrust Authority

It is commonly believed that the possibility to sue privately for antitrust damages decreases the number of type II errors in enforcement at the cost of creating more type I errors. We extend the analysis by taking into account the fact that private parties often submit evidence during public prosecution. Such parties consider private suit as a partial substitute for public prosecution, as both...

Antitrust limits to patent settlements

Intellectual property rights are widely recognized as critical assets in many industries, especially “high-tech” industries. Companies like IBM, Intel, and Hewlett-Packard regard their patents and copyrights, along with their other intangible assets such as know-how, as central elements giving them competitive advantage. Likewise, many software companies, from Microsoft to software startups see...

Antitrust Laws: the Nurse Wages Antitrust Litigation