Correction: Computing Profit-Maximizing Bid Shading Factors in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
We have N = {1, . . . , n} bidders, where each bidder has a private valuation vi drawn from distribution Fi 1 with strictly positive den1 Here, we assume that valuations follow the IPV model. sity, fi : Ti → R>0, for a good up for sale by the auctioneer, agent 0. In a first-price, sealed-bid auction, each agent has a type vi ∈ Ti, and submits a bid bi to the auctioneer, without revealing what t...
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We investigate the effect of regret-related feedback information on bidding behavior in sealed-bid first-price auctions. Two types of regret are possible in this auction format. A winner of the auction may regret paying too much relative to the second highest bid, and a loser may regret missing an opportunity to win at a favorable price. In theory, under very general conditions, being sensitive...
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As the fiscal agent of the Canadian Federal government, the Bank of Canada uses a sequence of multi-unit, sealed-bid, discriminatory-price auctions to manage excess cash reserves and to sterilize the effects of fiscal operations, thus ensuring that its monetary-policy goals are met. These auctions, which form an important part of the short-term loan market in Canada, provide a unique laboratory...
متن کاملThe Theory of First-price, Sealed-bid Auctions
1. Within the class of first-price, sealed-bid auctions, there are a number of possible variations in environment, information, and rules: (1) The number of potential bidders is either known, or unknown with a distribution that is common knowledge. (2) There may be no reservation price, so that the item will definitely be sold, or there may be a reservation price which is announced or unannounc...
متن کاملProcuring Commodities: First-Price Sealed-Bid or English Auctions?
I use laboratory experiments to examine the relative performance of the English auction (EA) and the first price sealed bid auction (FPA) when procuring a commodity. The mean and variance of prices are lower in the FPA than in the EA. Bids and prices in EA agree with game theoretic predictions while they don’t in the FPA. To resolve these deviations found in the FPA, I consider a mixture model ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Computational Economics
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['1572-9974', '0927-7099']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-022-10343-6