Correcting for Random Budgets in Revealed Preference Experiments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Estimation on stated-preference experiments constructed from revealed-preference choices
Constructing stated-preference (sp) experiments from a choice that the respondent made in a revealed-preference setting can enhance the realism of the sp task and the efficacy of preference revelation. However, the practice creates dependence between the sp attributes and unobserved factors, contrary to the independence assumption that is maintained for standard estimation procedures. We descri...
متن کاملEstimation on Stated - Preference Experiments Constructed from Revealed - Preference Choices ∗ by Kenneth Train and Wesley W
Transportation researchers have recently introduced a stated-preference (sp) method in which the attributes of the sp alternatives are based on the choice that the respondent made in a real-world setting. This practice can enhance the realism of the sp task and the efficacy of preference revelation. However, the practice creates dependence between the sp attributes and unobserved factors, contr...
متن کاملRanking Firms Using Revealed Preference Ranking Firms Using Revealed Preference∗
This paper estimates workers’ preferences for firms by studying the structure of employer-toemployer transitions in U.S. administrative data. The paper uses a tool from numerical linear algebra to measure the central tendency of worker flows, which is closely related to the ranking of firms revealed by workers’ choices. There is evidence for compensating differential when workers systematically...
متن کاملKnapsack Problems with Random Budgets
Given a set of elements, each having a profit and cost associated with it, and a budget, the 0-1 knapsack problem finds a subset of the elements with maximum possible combined profit subject to the combined cost not exceeding the budget. In this paper we study a stochastic version of the problem in which the budget is random. We propose two different formulations of this problem, based on diffe...
متن کاملRevealed Preference in Game Theory
I characterize joint choice behavior generated by the pure strategy Nash equilibrium solution concept by an extension of the Congruence Axiom of Richter(1966) to multiple agents. At the same time, I relax the “complete domain” assumption of Yanovskaya(1980) and Sprumont(2000) to “closed domain.” Without any restrictions on the domain of the choice correspondence, determining pure strategy Nash ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1556-5068']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4018505