منابع مشابه
Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Chinese Industrial Firms*
This article investigates whether market competition enhances the incentives of Chinese industrial firms to avoid corporate income tax. We estimate the effects of competition on the relationship between firms reported accounting profits and their imputed profits based on the national income account. To cope with measurement errors and potential endogeneity, we use instrumental variables, exogen...
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An increase in the taxation of foreign affi liates reduces domestic investment, as has recently been empirically shown in Becker and Riedel (2012). This paper investigates the implication of this finding for tax competition. It is shown that an increase in the number of multinational firms (in contrast to purely national firms) may actually mitigate tax competition — counter to the popular opin...
متن کاملTax competition when firms choose their
We analyze a sequential game between two symmetric countries when firms can invest in a multinational structure that confers tax savings. Governments are able to commit to long-run tax discrimination policies before firms’ decisions are made and before statutory capital tax rates are chosen non-cooperatively. Whether a coordinated reduction in the tax preferences granted to mobile firms is bene...
متن کاملSearch Costs and Corporate Income Tax Competition
This paper studies corporate tax competition if it is costly to learn some of the elements that determine the e¤ective tax burden. Search cost may, but need not, eliminate the tax competition pressure. The outcome depends on the boundaries of tax rate and tax base choices. Search cost can explain the empirically observed tax cuts cum base broadening. Keywords: Costly search, tax competition, co...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Tax and Public Finance
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0927-5940,1573-6970
DOI: 10.1007/s10797-012-9248-6