منابع مشابه
Corporate Financial Policies With Overconfident Managers∗
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We argue that individual characteristics of managers can explain capital structure decisions like debt conservatism and pecking-order nancing choices. Moreover, they can explain cross-sectional variation in these decisions despite identical rm characteristics. We link the reluctance of (some) managers to access external capital markets, and in particular equity markets, to managerial overcon ...
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In the Web dependent world, companies must respect and protect individuals’ information privacy. Companies develop and implement corporate information privacy policies to comply with the domestic and international information privacy laws and regulations. This paper investigates: (a) the approach used by multinational and domestic companies to develop and implement corporate information privacy...
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Separation between CEO and Chairman of the Board is typically viewed as evidence of good corporate governance. Surprisingly, the literature has failed so far to uncover any significant relation between CEO/Chairman duality and firm performance. By distinguishing between periods with and without CEO turnover, we empirically identify two offsetting effects: the correlation between duality and per...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0022-1090,1756-6916
DOI: 10.1017/s0022109014000702