Corporate payout policy and managerial stock incentives

Corporate Payout Policy and Managerial Stock Incentives*

We examine how corporate payout policy is affected by managerial stock incentives using data on more than 1100 nonfinancial firms during 1993-97. We find that management share ownership encourages higher payouts by firms with potentially the greatest agency problems—those with low market-to-book ratios and low management stock ownership. We also find that management stock options change the com...

Appendix for “ Managerial risk - taking incentives and corporate pension policy ”

Payout policy, agency conflicts, and corporate governance

We examine the effect of corporate governance on the use of dividends and repurchases, composition of payout, and inclusion of a pre-commitment feature in the payout policy. We find that dividend payout is decreasing in governance quality. Corporate governance has a mixed effect on repurchases: good external governance prompts managers to repurchase more and to use repurchases as the only form ...

Entrenchment, Incentives, Corporate Valuation and Dividend Payout Policy in Brazil and in Chile Motivation and Expected Policy Implications

A proposal presented to the IADB by Ricardo P. C. Leal, lead researcher, as a reply to the " Corporate Governance in Latin American and the Caribbean " call for

“ Essays on Corporate Governance , Managerial Incentives , and Crowdfunding ”

Ronghuo Zheng ([email protected]) “Essays on Corporate Governance, Managerial Incentives, and