Corporate governance, family firms, and innovation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Corporate Ownership and Control
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1810-3057,1727-9232
DOI: 10.22495/cocv18i1art11