Corporate governance and information asymmetry
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance
Disclosure is widely assumed to play an important role in corporate governance. Yet governance has not been the focus of previous academic analyses of disclosure. We consider disclosure in the context of corporate governance. We argue that disclosure is a two-edged sword. On one side, disclosure of information permits principals to make better decisions. On the other, it can create or exacerbat...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Management Science Letters
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1923-9335,1923-9343
DOI: 10.5267/j.msl.2014.6.048