Corporate governance, analyst following and firm value
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Corporate Governance
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1472-0701
DOI: 10.1108/cg-03-2011-0093