Corporate diversification, refocusing and shareholder voting
نویسندگان
چکیده
We examine if shareholders' attitude towards firm diversification strategy is revealed in their votes on management-initiated acquisition and divestment proposals using data voting by shareholders of UK public firms between 1997 2019. find that dissent higher for diversifying acquisitions lower refocusing divestments, especially when these involve diversified firms. also a negative relationship premium dissent. Our results provide evidence characteristics deals have significant impact divestments.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Review of Financial Analysis
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1873-8079', '1057-5219']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2021.101924