Corporate criminals in a market context: enforcement and optimal sanctions

Abstract By combining approaches from the economic theory of crime and industrial organization, this paper analyzes optimal enforcement for three different forms corporate misconduct that harm competition. The analysis shows why is more harmful in large markets, governments have a disinclination to sanction firms whose materializes abroad, leniency those who self-report their complement, not substitute, independent investigation enforcement. As public authorities rely increasingly on self-reporting by companies detect cartels, number applications likely decline, borne out data. Upon review 50 cases liability five European countries, competition law enforcement, governed unified legal regime, efficient than bribery money laundering cases, disparate criminal regimes. Sanction predictability transparency are higher when cooperate closely with each other there elements supra-national authority, offense regulated separate instrument. Given our results, Europe would benefit stronger cooperation regulation transnational crime, especially sake deterrent penalties against committed abroad.