Corporate budget governance through workforce engagement: As an antecedent to innovation

Corporate Governance and Innovation: Theory and Evidence

We develop a theory to show how external and internal corporate governance mechanisms a¤ect innovation. We show that there is a U-shaped relation between innovation and external takeover pressure, which arises from the interaction between expected takeover premia and private bene…ts of control. We show strong empirical support for the predicted relation using ex ante and ex post innovation meas...

Corporate Governance and Innovation: Theory and Evidence

We develop a theory of the e¤ects of external corporate governance mechanisms — such as takeover pressure — and internal mechanisms — such as compensation contracts and monitoring intensity — on innovation. Our theory generates the following testable predictions: (i) innovation varies non-monotonically in a U-shaped manner with takeover pressure; (ii) innovation increases with monitoring intens...

Corporate Governance as an Institution to Overcome Social Dilemmas

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Corporate Governance Based on Self-Interest as an Axiom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 The Financial Crisis and Corporate Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Corporate Governance Based on Psychological Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Team Production Theory of Corporate Governan...

Making Capital Markets Work through Corporate Governance

Regulating Organizations through Codes of Corporate Governance

Although codes of corporate governance have come to be widely used as a mode of regulating corporations, our understanding of how they function is still rather limited. In this paper we describe the design of such code regimes and propose a theoretical framework for studying their effects. On the basis of an observation-theoretical approach, codes are conceptualized as schemas of observation th...