منابع مشابه
Hedge Fund Activism and Bank Loan Contracting
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Financial Research
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0270-2592
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6803.2012.01327.x