CORPORATE BOARDS AND BANK LOAN CONTRACTING

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چکیده

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Financial Research

سال: 2012

ISSN: 0270-2592

DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6803.2012.01327.x