Core Stability and Core Selection in a Decentralized Labor Matching Market
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Core Stability and Core Selection in a Decentralized Labor Matching Market
We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through wage offers and wage demands, firms compete over workers and workers compete over jobs. Firms make hire-and-fire decisions dependent on the wages of their own workers and on the alternative workers available on the job market. Workers bargain for better jobs; either individuall...
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Decentralized matching platforms on the internet allow large numbers of agents to interact anonymously at virtually no cost. Very little information is available to market participants and trade takes place at many different prices simultaneously. We propose a decentralized, completely uncoupled learning process in such environments that leads to stable and efficient outcomes. Agents on each si...
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Flexible firms compete by means of wages in the Assignment market while rigid firms have no flexibility over terms of appointment in the Marriage market. Workers trade with both kinds of firms in the hybrid market. Examples show that standard results that characterize the core of the Marriage market (respectively, Assignment market) are not robust to the entrance of flexible (respectively, rigi...
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در این تحقیق به مطالعه وجود انتخاب نامساعد(کژ گزینی) در بازار بیمه درمان تکمیلی ایران پرداخته شده است. داده های مورد نیاز توسط پرسشنامه و به روش نمونه گیری خوشه ای جمع آوری شده است. پرسشنامه ها در میان افراد شاغل ساکن شهر تهران توریع شد. در این تحقیق با استفاده از تخمین دو مدل لجستیک و به دست آوردن ضریب همبستگی میان تقاضای بیمه درمان تکمیلی و رخداد خسارت به بررسی موضوع مورد نظر پرداخته شده است....
15 صفحه اولDecentralized Bargaining: Efficiency and the Core∗
This paper studies market clearing in matching markets. The model is non-cooperative, fully decentralized, and in Markov strategies. Workers and firms bargain with each other to determine who will be matched to whom and at what terms of trade. Once a workerfirm pair reach agreement they exit the market. Alternative possible matches provide endogenous outside options. We ask when do such markets...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games
سال: 2016
ISSN: 2073-4336
DOI: 10.3390/g7020010