Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our characterization does not require substitutable preferences, so it is separate from the structure needed for the non-emptiness of the core. When preferences are substitutable, our characterization g...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00184-4