Core convergence with asymmetric information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Core convergence with asymmetric information
We analyze the ex ante incentive compatible core for replicated private information economies. We show that any allocation in the core when the economy is replicated sufficiently often is approximately Walrasian for the associated Arrow–Debreu economy. 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C7; C71; D5
متن کاملOn the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information
In interim economies with asymmetric information, we show that the coarse core of Wilson (1978) does not converge to price equilibrium allocations as the economy is replicated. This failure of core convergence is a basic consequence of asymmetric information and extends to any reasonable notion of either (interim) core or price equilibrium. JEL Classification: C71, D51
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.005