Coordination Failures, Clusters, and Microeconomic Interventions

Coordination Failures

On Coordinating Coordination Failures

This paper examines whether a principal with limited knowledge of agents’ actions can use an income tax scheme to uniquely implement the Pareto optimal equilibrium in a coordination game (i.e. a game with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria). We show that, in contrast to games with externalities but a unique equilibrium, implementation in coordination games fails generically unless the identity o...

Equilibria with Coordination Failures

This paper extends the literature on equilibria with coordination failures to arbitrary convex sets of admissible prices. This makes it possible to address coordination failures for cases with price indexation or more general price linkages between commodities. We introduce a new equilibrium concept, called quantity constrained equilibrium (QCE), giving a unified treatment to all cases consider...

Decentralized Coordination with Crash Failures

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I thank my adviser, Professor Gul Agha, and the members of the Open Systems Laboratory for supporting my work with their time, resources and ideas. The study described in this thesis is a continuation of a project done in collaboration with Together we built all the infrastructure used in developing this thesis, I have made only relatively small improvements. Since the original ...

Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures

We revisit n-player coordination games with Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. As a novelty, we introduce fuzzy play and a matching device. By fuzzy play we mean that each player does not choose which pure strategy to play, but instead chooses a nonempty subset of his strategy set that he submits to the matching device. The matching device is a very simple one. It randomly selects a match if possib...