Coordination and Incentive Contracts in Project Management under Asymmetric Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Coordination and Incentive Contracts in Project Management under Asymmetric Information
We study the problem of the manager of a project consisting of two sub-projects or tasks which are outsourced to different subcontractors. The project manager earns more revenue from the project if it is completed faster, but he cannot observe how hard subcontractors work, only the stochastic duration of their tasks. We derive the optimal linear incentive contracts to offer to the subcontractor...
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We study the important problem of how a supplier should optimally share the consequences of demand uncertainty (i.e., the cost of inventory excesses and shortages) with a retailer in a two-level supply chain facing a finite planning horizon. In particular, we characterize a multiperiod contract form, the promised lead-time contract, that reduces the supplier’s risk from demand uncertainty and t...
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Tour guide plays an important role for achieving the overall service quality of a tourism supply chain. The service quality of tour guide can be improved by promoting service effort & service ability that are asymmetric information to travel agency. Two types of incentive contracts are commonly used by travel agency to motivate tour guide improving the service quality. These are a pooling contr...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2005
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.914227