Coordinated Route Planning via Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionary Computation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Computation of Stochastic Nash Equilibrium via Variable Sample Distributed Methods
In this paper, we propose a variable sample distributed algorithm for the computation of stochastic Nash equilibrium in which the objective functions are replaced, at each iteration, by sample average approximations. We investigate the contraction mapping properties of the variable sample distributed algorithm and show that the accuracy of estimators yielded in the algorithms to their true coun...
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Non-cooperative Game Theory provides a framework to analyze the strategic interactions of selfish agents in any given organization. In a pioneering work, John Nash (1951) [49] proved that in any such (finite) organization, there exists a steady state where no agent benefits by unilateral deviation, henceforth called Nash equilibrium (NE). Nash equilibrium is perhaps the most well known and well...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Chinese Journal of Aeronautics
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1000-9361
DOI: 10.1016/s1000-9361(11)60262-8