Cooperative prediction guidance law in target-attacker-defender scenario
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Science China Information Sciences
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1674-733X,1869-1919
DOI: 10.1007/s11432-018-9806-7