Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions
In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are associated with tasks, an agent may be involved in executing more than one task, and thus may distribute his resources among several coalitions. To tackle such scena...
متن کاملCooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions: Charting the Tractability Frontier
In many multiagent scenarios, agents distribute resources, such as time or energy, among several tasks. Having completed their tasks and generated profits, task payoffs must be divided among the agents in some reasonable manner. Cooperative games with overlapping coalitions (OCF games) are a recent framework proposed by Chalkiadakis et al. (2010), generalizing classic cooperative games to the c...
متن کاملStability and Arbitration in Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions
1.1 Classic Cooperative TU Games In classic cooperative games with transferable utility [4] (TU games), there is a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n}, where each subset S of N has some value v(S). The goal of the agents is to first form a coalition structure by partitioning N into disjoint sets; second, the value of each set in the partition is divided among its members. The payoff division x = (...
متن کاملArbitration and Stability in Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions
Overlapping Coalition Formation (OCF) games (Chalkiadakis, Elkind, Markakis, Polukarov, & Jennings, 2010) are cooperative games where players can simultaneously participate in several coalitions. Capturing the notion of stability in OCF games is a difficult task: deviating players may continue to contribute resources to joint projects with non-deviators, and the crucial question is what payoffs...
متن کاملArbitration and Stability in Cooperative Games in Overlapping Coalitions
Consider the following scenario: a group of agents is tasked with completing some projects; the agents divide into groups, and using the resources available to each group, agents generate profits, which must in turn be divided among group members. Cooperative game theory [Peleg and Sudhölter, 2007] studies such scenarios; formally, Given a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n}, the value of each sub...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1076-9757
DOI: 10.1613/jair.3075