Cooperative Games on Accessible Union Stable Systems

Harsanyi power solutions for games on union stable systems

This paper analyzes Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games in which partial cooperation is based on union stable systems. These structures contain as particular cases the widely studied communication graph games and permission structures, among others. In this context, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the Harsanyi power solutions which distribute the Harsanyi dividends proporti...

Additive stable solutions on perfect cones of cooperative games

Cooperative Games under Augmenting Systems

The goal of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework in order to analyze cooperative games in which only certain coalitions are allowed to form. We will axiomatize the structure of such allowable coalitions using the theory of antimatroids, a notion developed to combinatorially abstract sets. There have been previous models developed to confront the problem of unallowable coalitions. Ga...

Cooperative Games in MultiAgent Systems

In both human and artificial societies some activities are only allowed to coalitions that satisfy certain criteria, e.g., to sufficiently large coalitions or coalitions which involve players of sufficient seniority. Simmons (1988) formalised this idea in the context of secret sharing schemes by defining the concept of a (disjunctive) hierarchical access structure. The mathematical concept whic...

Cooperative games and multiagent systems

Forming coalitions is a generic means for cooperation: people, robots, web services, resources, firms, they can all improve their performance by joining forces. The use of coalitions has been successful in domains such as task allocations, sensor networks, and electronic marketplaces. Forming efficient coalitions requires the identification of matching synergies between different entities (find...