Cooperative concurrent games
نویسندگان
چکیده
In rational verification, the aim is to verify which temporal logic properties will obtain in a multi-agent system, under assumption that agents ("players") system choose strategies for acting form game theoretic equilibrium. Preferences are typically defined by assuming act pursuit of individual goals, specified as formulae. To date, verification has been studied using non-cooperative solution concepts - Nash equilibrium and refinements thereof. Such assume there no possibility forming binding agreements cooperate, such they restricted their applicability. this article, we extend cooperative concepts, field theory. We focus on core, most fundamental (and widely studied) concept. begin presenting variant core seems well-suited concurrent setting, show version can be characterised ATL*. then study computational complexity key decision problems associated with range from PSPACE 3EXPTIME. also investigate conditions sufficient ensure non-empty, explore when it invariant bisimilarity. introduce number variants main definition leading issue credible deviations, stronger notions collective stable behaviour. Finally, an alternative model preferences, players seek maximise mean-payoff over infinite play games where quantitative information allowed.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Artificial Intelligence
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['2633-1403']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2022.103806