Cooperation with Externalities and Uncertainty
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cooperation with Externalities and Uncertainty
We introduce a new class of cooperative games where the worth of a coalition depends on the behavior of other players and on the state of nature as well. We allow for coalitions to form both before and after the resolution of uncertainty, hence agreements must be stable against both types of deviations. The appropriate extension of the classical core concept, the Sustainable Core, is defined fo...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Networks and Spatial Economics
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1566-113X,1572-9427
DOI: 10.1007/s11067-014-9265-3