COOPERATION SPILLOVERS AND PRICE COMPETITION IN EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Inquiry
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0095-2583
DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00486.x