Cooperation on dynamic networks within an uncertain reputation environment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Reputation is required for cooperation to emerge in dynamic networks
Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC), Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain. Instituto de Biocomputación y Física de Sistemas Complejos (BIFI), Universidad de Zaragoza, Spain. Institute UC3M-Santander of Financial Big Data (IFiBiD) , Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain. Unidad Mixta Interdisciplinar de Complejidad y Comportamiento Social (UMICCS...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Scientific Reports
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2045-2322
DOI: 10.1038/s41598-018-27544-5