منابع مشابه
Enforcing Cooperation in Networked Societies
Which social norms and networks maximize cooperation in bilateral relationships? We study a network of players in which each link is a repeated bilateral partnership with two-sided moral hazard. The obstacle to community enforcement is that each player observes the behavior of her partners in their partnerships with her, but not how they behave in other partnerships. We introduce a new metric f...
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The most evident aspect of biodiversity is the variety of complex forms and behaviors among organisms, both living and extinct. Comparative molecular and physiological studies show that the evolution of complex phenotypic traits involves multiple levels of biological organization (i. Regardless of the specific molecular mechanisms and details, the evolution of different complex biological organ...
متن کاملCooperation and Collective Enforcement in Networked Societies ∗
We endogenize social network formation and social interaction using a model in which players interact bilaterally and repeatedly along costly links. Cooperation is supported by the threat of collective punishment. When the society is homogeneous, the optimal network consists of many separate cliques. Introducing heterogeneity gives rise to more realistic networks, with high clustering, small di...
متن کاملEcological competition favours cooperation in termite societies.
Conflict and competition lie at the heart of the theories of both ecology and sociobiology. Despite this, the interaction between societal conflicts on one hand and ecological competition on the other remains poorly understood. Here, we investigate this interaction in two ecologically similar sympatric termite species, Cryptotermes secundus Hill and Cryptotermes domesticus Haviland. We manipula...
متن کاملAnonymity in large societies
We formalize the notion of coalition measure as a primitive of social choice with a countably infinite number of agents. An example would be a dynamic setting with an infinite horizon, where it may be convenient to consider separately each individual’s preferences at every moment of time. In this setting, there are some “equal size” coalitions that a social choice rule should treat in the same ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2034396