Cooperation in a modified version of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Rational Cooperation in a Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
The Emergence and Evolution of Social Norms: Rational Cooperation in a Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
متن کاملRational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
A common observation in experiments involving finite repetition of the prisoners’ dilemma is that players do not always play the single-period dominant strategies (“finking”), but instead achieve some measure of cooperation. Yet finking at each stage is the only Nash equilibrium in the finitely repeated game. We show here how incomplete information about one or both players’ options, motivation...
متن کاملCooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Abstract: More than half a century after the first experiment on the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, evidence on whether cooperation decreases with experience–as suggested by backward induction–remains inconclusive. This paper provides a metaanalysis of prior experimental research and reports the results of a new experiment to elucidate how cooperation varies with the environment in this ...
متن کاملCooperation in a Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with Ostracism
The unique Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated n-person Prisoners’ Dilemma calls for defection in all rounds. One way to enforce cooperation in groups is ostracism: players who defect are expelled. If the group’s members prefer not to diminish its size, ostracism hurts the legitimate members of the group as well as the outcast. putting the credibility of the threat in doubt. Nonetheless, ...
متن کاملSustaining Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma with Local Interaction
This paper studies the repeated prisoners dilemma in a local interaction setup. We construct a sequential equilibrium in pure strategies that sustains cooperation for sufficiently patient players. The notion of sequential equilibrium is extended to extensive form games with inÞnite time horizon. The strategy is embedded in an explicitly deÞned expectation system, which may also be viewed as a ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 1997
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(97)00016-4