Cooperation by indirect revelation through strategic behavior
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity.
How can cooperation through indirect reciprocity evolve and what would it be like? This problem has previously been studied by simulating evolution in a small group of interacting individuals, assuming no gene flow between groups. In these simulations, certain 'image scoring' strategies were found to be the most successful. However, analytical arguments show that it would not be in an individua...
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Example 1.3. The English auction consists of a number of rounds. On round k = 1, 2, . . ., the auctioneer offers the good at price p = ke, asking all bidders if they are interested in the good at that price. The auction continues so long as more than one bidder is interested. The auction terminates, say at round t, when either exactly one or no bidders remain interested. If there is one interes...
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Theorists have only recently shown that cooperation through indirect reciprocity can evolve. The first modelling approach favoured a mechanism called image scoring. Helping someone increases one's image score, whereas refusing to help reduces it. The evolutionary outcome was a discriminator image scoring strategy that helps everybody who has, for example, a positive image score. Two experimenta...
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Evolution of indirect communication between two embodied agents is the research topic addressed in this thesis. Indirect communication is a niche that should be more common in intelligent robotics as it is essential in most areas where humans are present. Indirect communication is robust and can serve as either a supporting tool or a substitute for other means of communication. Evolutionary app...
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We propose a novel experimental method that disentangles strategicallyand non-strategicallymotivated behavior. We apply it to an indefinitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma game to observe simultaneously how the same individual behaves in situations with future interaction and in situations with no future interaction, while controlling for expectations. This method allows us to determine the exten...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 1994
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/bf01242848