Cooperation and control in multiplayer social dilemmas
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cooperation and control in multiplayer social dilemmas.
Direct reciprocity and conditional cooperation are important mechanisms to prevent free riding in social dilemmas. However, in large groups, these mechanisms may become ineffective because they require single individuals to have a substantial influence on their peers. However, the recent discovery of zero-determinant strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma suggests that we may have undere...
متن کاملPunishment and Cooperation in Stochastic Social Dilemmas
Previous findings on punishment have focused on environments in which the outcomes are known with certainty. In this paper, we conduct experiments to investigate how punishment affects cooperation in a two-person stochastic prisoner’s dilemma environment where each person can decide whether or not to cooperate and the outcomes of alternative strategies are specified probabilistically. In partic...
متن کاملSocial Dilemmas and Cooperation in Complex Networks
In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolutionary games on populations were the network of interactions among individuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff computation and, to some extent the timing of the operations, have a marked influence on the transient dynamics and on the amount of cooperation that can be established ...
متن کاملCooperation in social dilemmas, trust and reciprocity
The present study attempts to connect cooperative behavior in the repeated play prisoner’s dilemma (RPPD) with ‘‘trusting’’ and ‘‘reciprocal’’ behavior. Our goal is to see if people with different propensities to cooperate exhibit differing degrees of trust and reciprocity. We find the subjects who choose to cooperate in a RPPD game exhibit higher levels of trust. However when it comes to recip...
متن کاملCooperation in Social Dilemmas through Position Uncertainty∗
We propose a simple mechanism that sustains full cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. Players sequentially decide whether to contribute to a public good. They do not know their position in the sequence, but observe the actions of some predecessors. Position uncertainty provides an incentive to contribute in order to induce potential successors...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0027-8424,1091-6490
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1407887111