Cooperation and Community Responsibility: A Folk Theorem for Repeated Matching Games with Names
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games
The Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) folk theorem for discounted repeated games assumes that the set of feasible payoffs is full dimensional. We obtain the same conclusion using a weaker condition. This condition is that no pair of players has equivalent von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities over outcomes. We term this condition NEU "non-equivalent utilities". The condition is weak, easily interpreted, ...
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We introduce a “dynamic non-equivalent utilities” (DNEU) condition and the notion of dynamic player-specific punishments for a general repeated game with unequal discounting, both naturally generalizing the stationary counterparts in Abreu et al. (1994). We show that if the DNEU condition, i.e., no pair of players have equivalent utility functions in the repeated game, is satisfied, then any fe...
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This paper studies repeated games with privately observed signals where it is feasible but costly to observe other players’ past actions accurately. At the end of each period, players decide the set of players to monitor by paying the corresponding observation costs. We show that the folk theorem holds for any finite stage game that satisfies the fulldimensionality condition and a minimal disti...
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A canonical interpretation of an infinitely repeated game is that of a “dynastic” repeated game: a stage game repeatedly played by successive generations of finitely-lived players with dynastic preferences. These two models are in fact equivalent when the past history of play is observable to all players. In our model all players live one period and do not observe the history of play that takes...
متن کاملThe folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
The folk theorem literature has been relaxing the assumption on how much players know about each other’s past action. Here we consider a general model where players can “buy” precise information. Every period, each player decides whether to pay a cost to accurately observe the actions chosen by other players in the previous period. When a player does not pay the cost, he obtains only imperfect ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1213102