Convergent Double Auction Mechanism for a Prosumers’ Decentralized Smart Grid
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Convergent Double Auction Mechanism for a Prosumers' Decentralized Smart Grid
In this paper, we propose a novel automated double auction mechanism called convergent linear function submission-based double-auction (CLFS-DA) for a prosumers’ decentralized smart grid. The target decentralized smart grid is a regional electricity network that consists of many prosumers that have a battery and a renewable energy-based generator, such as photovoltaic cells. In the proposed dou...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Energies
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1996-1073
DOI: 10.3390/en81112315