Controlling Firms Through the Majority Voting Rule

Strategic Voting under the Qualified Majority Rule

This is an analysis of strategic voting under the qualified majority rule. Existing formal analyses of the plurality rule predict the complete coordination of strategic voting: A strict interpretation of Duverger’s Law. This conclusion is rejected. Unlike previous models, the popular support for each option is not commonly certain. Agents base their vote on both public and private signals of po...

Is Majority Rule the Best Voting Method? by

Recognizing Majority-Rule Equilibrium In Spatial Voting Games

It is provably difficult (NP-complete) to determine whether a given point can be defeated in a majority-rule spatial voting game. Nevertheless, one can easily generate a point with the property that if any point cannot be defeated, then this point cannot be defeated. Our results suggest that majority-rule equilibrium can exist as a purely practical matter: when the number of voters and the dime...

Protecting Minorities through the Average Voting Rule∗

Properties of an average voting rule the outcome being some weighted average of votes are investigated, with particular attention to its ability to protect minorities. The unique average voting outcome is characterized with a median formula which depends on the voters’ preferred allocations and some parameters constructed from the voters’ weights. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions ...

Majority Consensus and the Local Majority Rule

we only show one further result that emphasizes our point that understanding LMP is fundamental to understanding any generalization of this process. A simple generalization of the local majority process would allow vertex v to have some resistivity towards color switch. Formally, for a nonnegative integer kv, we de ne a kv-local majority rule for vertex v: ct+1 v = ( ctv if jfw 2 Nv : ctw = ctv...