Contrastivism Rather than Something Else? On the Limits of Epistemic Contrastivism
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Contrastivism Rather Than Something Else? On The Limits Of Epistemic Contrastivism
One of the most recent trends in epistemology is contrastivism. It can be characterized as the thesis that knowledge is a ternary relation between a subject, a proposition known and a contrast proposition. According to contrastivism, knowledge attributions have the form “S knows that p, rather than q”. In this paper I raise several problems for contrastivism: it lacks plausibility for many case...
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Jonathan Schaffer is sympathetic to the contextualist approach to epistemology, broadly construed, but thinks that it hasn’t got the account of the verb “knows” quite right. Contextualists are on to something, but their view needs to be reformulated to give a correct account of the way we talk about knowledge, and (he argues) the reformulated view can do a better job of developing and defending...
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Contextualism treats ‘knows’ as an indexical that denotes different epistemic properties in different contexts. Contrastivism treats ‘knows’ as denoting a ternary relation with a slot for a contrast proposition. I will argue that contrastivism resolves the main philosophical problems of contextualism, by employing a better linguistic model. Contextualist insights are best understood by contrast...
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In this paper I argue for contrastivism about reasons. Just as contrastivism about causation and knowledge hold that ‘cause’ and ‘knows’, respectively, express relations with argument places for sets of alternatives, contrastivism about reasons holds that ‘reason’ expresses a relation with an argument place for a set of alternatives. Some consideration might be a reason for an action relative t...
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In his recent book 'Moral Skepticisms' Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues in great detail for contrastivism with respect to justified moral belief and moral knowledge. In this paper I raise three questions concerning this view. First, how would Sinnott-Armstrong account for constraints on admissible contrast classes? Second, how would he deal with notorious problems concerning relevant reference c...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Erkenntnis
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0165-0106,1572-8420
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-008-9111-4