Contractual structure in agriculture with endogenous matching
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Contractual structure in agriculture with endogenous matching
☆ We would like to thank Sandeep Baliga, Kaniska D Prendergast, Eric Maskin, Martin Wittenberg, and es erees for helpful feedback, and Devaki Ghose for rese thor would like to thank the Institute for Adv hospitality during the academic year 2000–01 when was written. A more recent version was circulated as dogenousMatching in Partnerships”, C.E.P.R. Discussion Pa thor thanks the Social Sciences ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Development Economics
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0304-3878
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.05.005