Contractual Incompleteness for External Risks
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1935-1704,2194-6124
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1594