Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria
This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with direct exter-nalities between principals both under complete and asymmetric information. Direct externalities arise when the contracting variable of one principal affects directly the other principal’s payoff. Out-ofequilibrium messages are used by principals to precommit themselves to distort their strategic ...
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We analyze the set of payoffs achieved at truthful equilibria of a delegated common agency game under complete information and the set of equilibrium payoffs achieved with differentiable contributions for the same game under asymmetric information. Those sets depends on how equilibrium contribution schedules are extended off the equilibrium. We show that, as the asymmetric information shrinks t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Advances in Theoretical Economics
سال: 2003
ISSN: 1534-5963
DOI: 10.2202/1534-5963.1037