Contractual Dualism, Market Power and Informality
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Product Market Competition and Informality in Mexico
Mexico has engaged in many trade agreements that have left unaffected internal competition, being one of the most trade-opened countries in the world is also one of the most restrictive regarding product market competition. For developing countries, this is a field to study that still need to be undertaken. This paper relates informality in the Mexican labor markets outcomes with market competi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Economic Journal
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0013-0133
DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12222