Contracts, resource use and productivity in sharecropping
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Pretend-but-Perform Contracts in Sharecropping
This paper is an exercise in the design of contracts within aworld of two persons, namely a landlord and a tenant, restricted tosharecropping. The landlord sets the shares according to the profit-maximizing "golden rule" ([4]), which depends on certain characteris-tics of the tenant. The tenant declares these characteristics, and isthus allowed to pretend to be someone else,...
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La Soledad case is illustrative of the contracting issue under conditions where reputation as an enforcement device is ineffective, and where there is no coercive power. Initially, tenancy practices were organized among local actors, on the basis of personal relationships; contractual enforcement was not a critical issue. The introduction of a new crop (potato) by ‘outsiders’ --entrepreneur-typ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Development Studies
سال: 1986
ISSN: 0022-0388,1743-9140
DOI: 10.1080/00220388608421988