Contracts as Reference Points—Experimental Evidence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Contracts as Reference Points: Experimental Evidence
Contracts as Reference Points: Experimental Evidence In a recent paper, Hart and Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long term contracts and important aspects of the employment relation. However, so far there exists no direct evidence that supports these assumptions and, in particular, Hart and Moore’s notion that contracts provide reference points. In this paper,...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.2.493