Contracts as Organizations

Professionalism and Contracts in Organizations

Employees in public agencies rarely have pay for performance: instead their incentives are often guided by a sense of professionalism. This paper concerns how organizations should monitor professionals. The primary outcome of the paper is that weak incentives lead public agencies to exhibit bias in their oversight, by rewarding the interests of their employees to the detriment of other constitu...

Contracts and Conflict in Organizations

In many organizations, the way that incentive problems are alleviated is not via contracts, but rather who is hired. This paper offers a theory of targeted hiring, and how its role changes as contracting becomes poorer. ∗University of Chicago, GSB. Email: [email protected]. Thanks to Wouter Dessein, Bob Gibbons, and seminar participants at the University of Chicago, Columbia U...

Managing Virtual Organizations with Contracts

Electronic business networks are formed by business application services provided by autonomous enterprises. For controlling the business network behaviour and partnerships, electronics contracts are commonly used. This paper focuses on dynamic virtual organizations where participants can join and leave, or be removed, for various reasons, and the organization structure can change for various r...

Lectures on the Theory of Contracts and Organizations

Project Management, Internal Contracts and Dynamics of Organizations

The increasing complexity of certain projects gives rise to new types of internal contracts inside the firm. These should be seen as supports aimed at better controlling the balance between centralization and decentralization. They can also be seen as means of conciliating planning and learning issues, necessary to co-ordinate interdependant activities in a very uncertain environment. In order ...